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Abstract 
Within a dynamic environment, this paper introduces an inside trader to an economy 
where rational, but uninformed, traders choose between investment projects with different
levels of insider trading. When inside information has little value in future investment 
decisions, insider trading distorts investment towards assets with less private information, 
imposing net welfare costs on the economy. When an insider's private information is 
valuable in making future investment decisions, the net social benefit of inside trading 
can be positive; the resulting increases in investment efficiency due to more informative 
prices is enough to compensate for the distortion induced by the inside trader. 
When insiders receive private information more than once, insiders may trade to reveal 
their private information at the beginning of their relationship with the firm. This has 
two effects; i) more information is revealed in equilibrium and ii) there is less chance than
an uninformed agent will have to trade with the insider. Both these effects reduce the 
investment inefficiencies associated with insider trading. As a consequence, uninformed 
liquidity traders prefer to trade in a market with a long-term insider. This improvement 
in investment efficiency, leads to a Pareto improvement - both the uninformed traders 
and the insider are made better off if the insider receives information more than once. 
'The first two authors are grateful to the SSHRC for financial support. We would also like to thank 
the Vancouver Stock Exchange for financial support. We wish to thank Jonathan Berk, Bob Dammoni 
Merwan Engineer, Paul Fischer, Rick Greeni Praveen Kumar, Huw Lloyd-Ellis, Ted Neave) Gregor Smith, 
Chester Spatt, Raman Uppal, participants at the 1992 Western Finance Association Meetings, the 1991 
Canadian Economic Theory conference, the 1991 Pacific Northwest. Finance conference and finance 
seminars at Carnegie Mellon University, MIT and UBC for useful comments. The usual disclaimer 
applies. 
Introduction 
One of the more controversial issues in stock market policy is the regulation of insider trading. In 
this paper, we analyze the costs and benefits of banning insiders in a dynamic, general equilibrium 
economy. Our analysis allows explicit Pareto comparasons amongst economies with and without 
insider trading. Insiders' trading reveals private information, and to the extent that this information 
is correlated to future productive opportunities, insider trading enhances productive efficiency. 
Since insider trading profits come at the expense of liquidity traders, rational liquidity traders will 
invest less in firms with substantial insider trading. This will distort investment away from firms 
with heavy insider trading, resulting in investment inefficiency. We analyze the trade-off amonst 
these effects. 
Suppose the insider receives private information more than once. For example, an oil company 
most likely develops more than one oil well, and an insider is likely to be privately informed about 
more than one of those wells. How should the insider trade in this situation? We show that if 
the insider values future trading profits enough, then in equilibrium, she will trade to reveal her 
private information at the beginning of her relationship with the firm. This has two effects: i) 
prices become more informative and ii) there is less chance that uninformed traders will have to 
trade against an inside trader in the future. Both these effects increase investment efficiency. Thus. 
insiders with an enduring relationship with the firm can lead to a Paret.o improvement, making all 
participants, including the outsiders, better off. 
We view our analysis as particularly relevant to small resource exploration stocks. One can 
imagine an insider who forsakes short term trading profits from information about a resource 
discovery for the greater future insider trading profits associated with increased exploration. Such 
insiders often initially hold large stakes in their firms. Other examples where the analysis seems 
appropriate include new product. development., takeovers and mergers. 
To our knowledge, our model is the first dynamic general equilibrium model to incorporate both 
the benefits and costs of insider trading. The benefits of insider trading evolve from the fact that 
prices will reflect more information in the presence of insider trading. If this information is socially 
valuable, permitting insider trading may result in a superior allocation of resources. Manne ( 1966) 
was the first to make this argument. George (1988) documents how insider trading may lead to
more efficient prices in a rational expectations model. In a static partial equilibrium model, Leland 
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(1992) argues that insiders may improve investment decisions. Fishman and Hagerty (1992) point
out that allowing insiders to trade may lead to less informative prices. The increased competition 
from insiders may reduce the incentive of other a.gents to purchase costly information. Thus, it is 
possible in equilibrium less information is gathered so that prices are less informative. 
The arguments that insider trading is socially costly include Brudney (1979) who claims that
insider trading is unfair to uninformed investors. Glosten (1989) develops a model where insider
trading leads to imperfect risk-sharing, and if there is too much private information there is a loss 
of liquidity in the market. This imposes costs on liquidity traders. Leland (1992) points out that
insider trade may reduce the liquidity of the market, hurting uninformed traders. 
'Manove (1989) looks at the investment distortions caused by allowing insider trading. He
constructs a static model1 in which insiders can capture a share of the profits made by investment.
This reduces the incentive for firms to make profitable investments. distorting investment. 
Our paper is closest in spirit to Ausubel (1990) who also considers a general equilibrium en­
vironment. Ausubel introduces both production and preference shocks to his competitive rational 
expectations economy so that the equilibrium is necessarily partially revealing. He shows that a 
policy of forcing the insider to reveal his private information before any trading takes place may 
be Pareto superior. This is generally socially beneficial because when insiders trade, both types of 
payoff-relevant information are revealed so that investment by the uninformed is better targeted. 
In his competitive environment, however, insiders do not act. strategically. In contrast., our single 
insider trades in a competitive dealership market. which forces her to consider the effects of her 
trades on the equilibrium price and the information it contains. All other agents must take account 
of this strategic behaviour. In our dynamic environment, the decisions of whether and how to 
exploit inside information are closely intertwined with t.he nature of the insider's relationship with 
the firm, as well as the firm's past and current performance. 
The main results of our analysis are as follows. We first detail how rational, but uninformed. 
investors are affected by the presence of insiders in some markets. Recognizing that they may have 
to trade in a market. where some agents have private information so that they will not get the 
"fair" price for their hoidings, uninformed invest.ors will over-invest in safe assets. Consequently, 
the return to the assets with insiders must be greater to compensate the investors. 
1 His equilibriun1 concept is nonstandard; those \\·ho bid above a certain level are allocated shares, and not to the 
highest bidders. Further, agents do not opti1uize. 
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The presence of the insiders, however, may actually be beneficial to the uninformed investors, 
ex ante. Information that past insiders possessed may be revealed through the trading process. 
The information in past prices provides useful information about future productive opportunities 
to the uninformed investors. If past prices are sufficiently correlated with future payoffs, then past 
insider trade is valuable in targeting the investment of the uninformed. As a consequence, net 
trading volume predicts future payoffs on production technologies. 
The net effects of insider trade on the welfare of the uninformed investors are ambiguous. The 
uninformed investors prefer to have had insiders trade in the past for the information revealed 
through past prices, but not in the future when they may have to trade insiders. When there is 
enough persistence in production shocks, the value of the information content in prices will outweigh 
the investment distortion costs so that the presence of an insider is socially beneficial. 
We also analyze the trading strategy of different types of insiders. Insiders differ with respect 
to the period of time for which they will be privy to inside information about a firm. Short­
term insiders, insiders who only have private information once. care only about maximizing their 
immediate profits and hence always trade t.o conceal their information. Long-term insiders. insiders 
who can exploit private information again in the future, weigh the future investment consequences 
of their immediate trades. For instance, if they purchase enough to raise current prices, beliefs of 
uninformed invest.ors will be affected so that more will be invested. This increases future insider 
trading profits. 
We show that an equilibrium to the model always exists and is unique in the sense that expected 
payoffs are unique. Unless the value of the gain in future profits to an insider seeing good news 
from increasing investment in the firm strictly exceeds the gain t.o an insider seeing bad news 
receiving the same investment, the insider always tries to conceal her private information. As the 
weight insiders place on future profits increases, the amount an insider trades independent of her 
information increases, so that the equilibrium volume at which the market maker cannot discern 
good news from bad increases. This is because an insider who sees bad news also has an incentive
to increase purchases or short sell less in order to affect investor beliefs. If insiders value future 
profits sufficiently, an insider seeing bad news may even purchase a positive amount today in an 
attempt to convince the uninformed that her private inforn1ation is good. 
Conversely, if an insider seeing good news gains more from increased investment. and values 
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future profits sufficiently, then the insider may select. a trading strategy so that initial prices are fully 
revealing. The insider forsakes immediate insider profits for long term gains. Taking a discernably 
long position credibly conveys the good news to the investors, information which may not be 
credibly revealed in other ways. In this instance the uninformed strictly prefer to face long-term 
insiders to short-term insiders. With long-term insiders, past prices contain more information and 
there is less chance that the uninformed investors will be exploited by an insider in the future. 
The plan of the paper is follows. In Section 1, we develop and analyze a simple general equi­
librium, overlapping generations economy with rational, but uninformed "liquidity" traders and a 
short-term inside trader. Section 2 extends the analysis to consider long-term insiders who will
have private information about payoffs in successive periods. Section 3 concludes. All proofs are 
contained in an appendix. 
1 Short-term Insider 
In this section we develop the overlapping generations economy. The economy features rational. 
but. uninformed, liquidity traders who live for three periods. In the middle of their lives, some 
of the liquidity traders will have to liquidate their portfolios. When they are young, they decide 
how to allocate their investment capital between two assets which pay off two periods hence. One 
of the assets is risk free, while the other asset has risky returns. There is an insider who next 
period will acquire advance information about the payoff of the risky asset .. Trading is through a 
competitive, risk-neutral uninformed market maker. The market maker only observes the net. order 
flow, so that he may not be able to distinguish high liquidity shocks and lit.tie short selling by an 
insider seeing bad news from less liquidity demand and large insider purchases by an insider seeing 
good news. Because the productive shocks are positively autocorrelated, any information revealed 
through equilibrium prices is useful for the next generation of liquidity traders. 
Consider an overlapping generations economy with dates t = -oo . .. , -1. 0, 1, . .. oo. There are 
three types of agents in the economy: uninformed traders, insiders and market. makers. All agents 
are risk neutral. A continuum of measure one of three period-lived uninformed traders is born each 
period t. Each uninformed investor is endowed with one unit of productive capital, which can be 
used to invest in the two projects, A and B. These projects pay off in consumption goods two 
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periods hence. The payoff to project B is random. 2 The payoffs at time t + 2 to time t projects
are: 
(1) 
where a(·) and b( · ) are neo-classical, concave production functions, Kj·'+2 is the amount of capital
invested in project i at t which comes to fruition in t + 2. The first superscript in KJ·'+2 refers to
the date at which the investment is made, while the second superscript refers to the date at which 
the project pays-off. The production functions a(·) and b( ·) satisfy:
a(O) = b(O) = 0, a'(O) > 0, b'(O) = oo, a1(1) � 1;
a'(·) >  O,b'(-) > 0, b"(-) $ O, a"(·) < 0. 
The conditions on the derivatives of the production technologies ensure that the equilibrium 
features investment in both projects. 
The technology shock, IJ1, follows a two-state Markov process ta.king on either the value H or
L. where 0 < L < H. Denote the probability transition function for IJ1 by:
7r(IJ') = Prob (1J1+1 = HJIJ'), 
7r(H) = Prob ( 1J1+1 = HJIJ' = H) ,
7r(L) = Prob (1J1+1 = HJIJ' = L) . 
Without loss of generality we rewrite:. 
7r(H) = 7r(l - 1) + 'Y· 
7r(L) = 7r(l - 1), (2) 
where 7r is the unconditional probability that. IJ1 = H. The parameter 'Y measures the persistence
in the process. We assume that the process is positively autocorrelated, so 0 ::=; 'Y < l. If 'Y = O
then the technology shock is i. i. d. and as 'Y approaches one, then the technology shocks become
perfectly positively correlated over time. The positive persistence in the technology shock implies 
that 7r(H) � 7r(L), so that E (IJl+2JIJ' = H] � E [1Jl+2JIJ1 = L]. We will sometimes refer to ()1 = H 
as good news. 
20ur analysis carries through if project ii payoffs are stochastic, as well. 
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In period t+ 1, a random measure, s'+ 1 E {I, h} where O < I < h < l, of the uninformed investors
receive an uninsurable liquidity shock. Either measure h or measure I of the uninformed traders 
receives this liquidity shock which forces them to sell in period t+l all claims to period t+2 output. 
We assume that these shocks are equally likely and are independent of the technology shocks. If the 
liquidity shock is h, then to a particular uninformed agent, h is the probability that he will receive 
a liquidity shock, forcing him to sell all his shares. Hence, 1- (hi"/) is the unconditional probability
that he will not receive a liquidity shock, � is the unconditional probability that he has to sell in the
h state, and � is the unconditional probability that he has to sell in the I state. Thus, there are four
possible { 01, s1} shock combinations that can occur in the economy, { (H, h), (H, I), (L, h), (L, I)}. 
The economy has two market makers, one for each project. The role of each market maker is 
to take opposite sides of all trades in t.he markets for the claims on the projects' out.puts at t + 2. 
These market makers stand ready to buy /sell all demands at t + 1 for claims to output at t + 2. 
Each market maker sees past. prices, past B's, and current net order flow in his own market, but not 
that in the other market.3 As in Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) and Kyle (1985), each competitive
specialist pools orders and sets a price in units of the current output good which, conditional on 
his information, leaves him zero expect.ed profits. The specialist is not liquidity constrained. 
Besides the uninformed investors and the market maker, there is an insider. At time t, the 
insider learns the value of e1+1• As in Kyle (1985), she uses this information as well as the pricing 
schedule to determine her asset trades. In this section we assume that this insider has only a 
temporary relationship with the firm: she receives inside information about. the firm only once. 
Hence she trades to maximize expected current period profits. In Sect.ion 2. we analyze the case 
where the insider has a long-term relationship with the firm. 
For simplicity. we assume that each uninformed investor ·'has his own project.'' which he sells to 
the appropriate specialists in the event of a liquidity shock the next. period. We could alt.ernat.ively 
set up a single project. share market. Our results are robust to the project market. formulation. 
We now define some useful notation. Let K',t+2 = {K.�1+2, K�'+2} represent aggregate capital
invested at time t in projects A, B that. pay off at time t + 2 and let q' be the insider's trade in
3This assumption is made to reduce notational clutter. Equilibriu111 outcotnes are unchanged jf market makers 
could observe net orde1· flo,vs in both markets, or equivalently if there "'ere a single inarket n1aker. In these instances, 
the insider must transact in both markets so that order fio\\' in 1narket .4 contains uo i11for1nation about the realization 
of liquidity trade and hence cannot reveal i11for1nation about the fJ :realization. The insider can do this by inaking the 
same transactions in both 1narkets, or by choosing an uninforn1ative stochastic purchase in market .4. The assumption 
that each specialist observes only the net order flow in his n1arket avoids this added co111plexity. 
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market B in period t. Then, 
vk = q' - s' (3)
is the net order flow observed by the market maker in market B. The specialist's pricing function 
in market i E {A,B}, is given by P;(vi,Kt-l,t+l,11'), and realized equilibrium prices are given by 
t P;·
A time line for a representative period t is given by figure 1. 
Time t 
Time t + 1 
Figure 1 - The Time Line 
Output of t - 2's project paid out, revealing ()'.
New uninformed agents and insider born. 
()1+1 revealed to the insider.
Liquidity shock to agents born at t - l. 
Trade claims on output at t + 1, p: determined.
New uninformed make investment decisions K'·'+2. 
We will consider perfect Bayesian equilibrium of this model. This equilibrium concept requires 
that at each time and information set. , each player is acting optimally. conditional on their beliefs 
about the technology and liquidity shocks, the distribution of future prices of claims to the tech­
nologies, and the strategies of the other players. Further, we require that all agents' beliefs are 
restricted to the support of the technology and liquidity shocks and satisfy Bayes rule wherever 
possible. We now formally define the equilibrium. 
Definition: A symmetric4 perfect Bayesian equilibrium with a short-term insider is a collection
of the following at each date t: 
1. Investments by each uninformed trader given his conjecture at time t a.bout the price dis­
tribution of claims at t + 1 in projects A, B, which pay off in two periods, k1•1+2(pk. II') = 
4 Asymmetric equilibria feature the san1e aggregate i11vestn1e11t levels and prices. For expositional reasons "'e 
present the symmetric version of the equilibrium. 
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{ k�1+2(pk, 81), �,�'+2(pk, 8') } ,  yielding aggregate investment levels, K'·'+2(pk, 8' ), such that
Kt,1+2 (pk, B') = k'.t+2(p�, e' )5.
2. A strategy for the insider in project B which details her purchases as a function of the public
information, (Kt-I,t+I, 81), and her private information, 01+1, given her conjectures about the
market maker's pricing function: q (81+1, 01, Kt-l,t+l; Pa( ·)).6 
3. A belief functionµ: n x n x {H,L} =} [0, 1] giving the beliefs of the market makers and
uninformed investors that the insider observed 01+1 = H conditional on the current order
flow and the current public information (Kt-l,t+1, 81).
4. A pricing function for each specialist which, given public information (Kt-l,t+l, 81) and the
net order flow in the specialist's market, determines the price P; ( V;, K1-1.t+l, 81 ) , i = A, B at 
which each specialist buys/ sells the asset . .
Such that: 
1. The insider selects q (e1+1 , 81, K1-l.1+1; Pa(·)) to maximize expected profits, where expecta­
tions are taken over the liquidity shocks:
(4) 
and her conjecture about the specialist's pricing function satisfies rational expectations. 
2. The specialist in each market i sets P; (vi, K1-1.1+1, 81) to earn zero expected profits, condi­
tional on all information available to him. This implies that for B,
(5) 
and for A, 
(6) 
wl1ere expectations are taken usi11g the market maker's beliefs defined above, and the beliefs 
satisfy Bayes' rule where applicable. 
5\Vithout loss of generality all uniufortued traders are assuu1ed to inake the same investment decisions. The 
equality follo"'s since there is a measure one of uninformed agents. 
6We suppress argu1nents of q (tr+1, 81, J.;1-1·1+1; P8( ·) )\\'here they are clear fro1n the context. 
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3. Each uninformed trader chooses his project allocation to maximize expected lifetime payouts.
That is, he solves:
max a (k�1+2) + (i - h 2+ 1) E [01+2101 ,pk] b ( k�t+2) + kt,t+2 kt,1+2 
A ' B  
�E [PB(q-h,K1•1+2,o')IO',pk] + �E [PB(q- l,K'.t+2,0')IO',p�J
subject to : k�1+2 + k�'+2 :S 1,
(7) 
where the uninformed's beliefs about ot+I are consistent with the market maker's and their
conjectures a.bout next period's price satisfy rational expectations . 
The first term in ( 7) refers to the uninformeds' investment in the riskless technology. The second
term refers to the expected payoff of the risky technology, given the uninformed does not receive a 
liquidity shock. The third and forth terms refer to the expected payoff in the event of a high and 
low liquidity shock, respectively. This formulation of the equilibrium incorporates the result that 
the uninformed will not trade in the market when they are young or middle aged unless required 
by a liquidity shock to cash in their holdings prematurely: t.o avoid trading against. the insider. 
they will hold their claims to output. if possible. 
In the analysis below we first show that. the insider must earn strictly positive expected profits. 
Hence equilibrium prices cannot always perfectly reveal the insider's privat.e information. Were 
equilibrium prices always revealing, then the equilibrium zero expected profits condition for the 
market maker conditional on the order flow would require that he set price equal to ot+1b(K1-l,t+I ). 
But then the insider would earn zero profits. a contradiction. 
The intuition for why the insider must expect positive profits and hence why prices cannot be 
perfectly revealing is as follows: the zero expected profits condition for the market maker places a 
bound on the possible price that can be charged for the asset. However, bounding prices by the 
possible asset values leaves room for positive expected profits for the insider at one information 
set. Since she can always trade zero there is no way for the market maker to recoup at the other 
information set. Thus, no equilibrium exists with revealing prices in a!! states. Formally stated: 
Lemma 1 In any equilibrium the insider's expected profits are strictly positive. Hence there does 
not exist an equilibri'Um in which p·rices always perfectly re·veal the insider's private information. 
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We now strengthen lemma 1 to show how· the insider must trade in any equilibrium. To avoid 
revealing her private information, the insider must trade so that the net order flow is uninformative. 
A result of this is that the insider's expected profits are the same in any equilibrium, where the 
expectations are taken over the liquidity and production shocks. Since the losses of the uninformed 
investors must correspond with the insider's profits, the size of the investment distortion due to 
insider trading is the same in any equilibrium. 
Lemma 2 Jn any pure strategy equilibrium, the short-term insider's trading strategy is given by: 
q (et+I = H, li1, Kk-l,t+I; Pa) =a (e', Kt-l,t; Pa) (h - I),
q (e1+1 =L,li'.Kk-1•1+1;Pa) = (a (e1.K1-1·';Pa)-1) (h-l).
where 0 :S: a :S: 1. 
(8) 
Further, the insider's expected profits before observing the production shock are constant across all 
vaZ.ues of a, 0 :S: a :S: 1. The insider's expected profits are given by: 
(9) 
where 7r(li1) is defined to be Prob(ii1+1 = HJ1i1), the probability of a high shock in t+ 1 conditional 
on the previ.ous period's productivity realization. 
The zero expected profit. condition for the market maker requires that the expected losses of 
the uninformed investors must equal the insider's expected profits: the investors therefore require 
the insider premium JP(7r(li1)) to compensate them for the insider's presence in asset B. Since the
investment. distort.ion is determined by the size of the insider's expected profits, lemma 2 implies 
that. the size of the distort.ion is the same in any possible equilibrium. Lemma 2 also implies that.
the only three {net. order flow, price} pairs that. will be observed in equilibrium are: 
{ a(h -l )  - l, Hb ( Kk-1•1+1)},
{a(h - l)-h. [7r(li1)H+(l-7r(li1))L]b (Kk-1.1+1)}.
{(a - l)(h-1) - h, Lb ( Kk-l,t+I)}.
We now show that an equilibrium exists and that the equilibrium beliefs of the market maker 
uniquely identify the quantity traded by the insider when he sees 01+1: The insider's equilibrium 
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trading volumes are unique, as are the set of prices, investment levels and allocations along the 
equilibrium path. 7 
The intuition for the uniqueness results is as follows. If the insider sees a high realization 
and hence purchases a positive quantity, this will be revealed when there is little liquidity trade. 
Conversely, if the insider sees a low realization and hence short sells, this will be revealed when 
there are high liquidity sales. In equilibrium, the insider seeing a high realization must trade so 
that when there is a high liquidity shock she is confused by the market maker with an insider 
seeing a low realization when there is a low liquidity shock. Beliefs must be 7r( 81) in this case. For 
such a strategy to be optimal, the indifference curves for both types of insiders must be tangent at 
these beliefs and implied trading volumes in {net order flow, market maker beliefs} space. There 
is a unique net order flow where such a tangency exists. Figure 2 illustrates a belief schedule that 
supports the equilibrium. 
Proposition 1 The investment levels of the uninformed and the strategies of the insider are the 
same across all equilibria; only the market maker "s off-eq'llilibri'llm beliefs differ across equilibria. 
The following characterizes the set of equilibria that can arise with a short-term insider: 
A. The insider trades (1 - 7r(ll1)) (h-l) > 0 if her private information is H, and -7r(iJ1)(h-l) < 0
if she observes L. 
B k t . 1 t (K'-1.1+1) ' l d . The market maker in mar ·et A se s pri.ce equa o a. A ,or al net or er flows. The
market maker's pricing function in B satisfies: 
where the market maker's beliefs. µ( vh, ., · J. satisfy Bayes· rule: 
µ(vh,.,-) = 7r(iJ1) vh = -7r(ll1)(h- l) - l, 
{ 0 vh < -h 
1 vh 2': -1
and for -h < v\t1 < -l .• satisfy the following bound: 
(7r(ll1J)2 (h- l) } 
t l . . VB + 
(11) 
7In a similar vein Rochet and Vila (1992) den1onstrate uniqueness of equilibriu1n for a slightly different class of 
trading games. There, the key features are that the surplus (the value of the existing project) is constant, independent 
of the trading decisions of the insider and that the insider kno\vs the value of the liquidity shock before trading. 
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C. Investment by each uninformed trader solves: 
where 
E [IP(,,.(11'+1))111 ',ph] = µJP(,,.(H)) + [1- µ)IP(7r(L))
is the expected insider premium. Note that the expectations reflect the beliefs associated with 
the price set by the market maker in the current period. 
An uninformed trader would never want to trade when middle aged unless forced to by a 
liquidity shock: his expected consumption and, hence his utility since he is risk neutral, would be 
reduced by the size of the insider premium. The condition a'(l) ;::-: 1 ensures that the uninformed
want. to invest all of their productive capital when young and do not want t.o trade with the old. 
Since the production functions are strictly concave, there exists a unique efficient level of in­
vestment which equates 
(13) 
A comparison of equations (12) and (13) immediately reveals that. the effect of insider trading 
is to induce discretionary, but uninformed, investors to invest. disproportionately in asset. A where 
there is no adverse selection. More formally, 
Proposition 2 The equilibrium level of investment i.s inefficiently di.started toward the safe asset 
. tt+·) �tt+? �tt+·J A and away from asset B zn the sense that K iJ - < K iJ - , where K 8 - is the efficient level of 
investment in project B conditional on current public information. 
More generally, this investment distortion exists in any economy characterized by differing 
degrees of insider trade (inducing differing degrees of adverse selection) and discretionary, rational 
investment by the uninformed. These welfare costs are, however, offset by the fact that insider 
trading also helps the uninformed to make better investment decisions through the conditioning oi 
their forecasts of IJ'+2 on the information contained in the current price, Ph· The presence of the
insider leads to a finer public information set. We now document the tradeoffs numerically. 
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1.1 Example 
Suppose that the unconditional probability of a production shock of H is given by 0.3, the state­
space for the productivity shocks is {0.1, 2.0}, the liquidity shocks are given by: h = 0. 75, l = 0.25, 
and the production functions are given by: 
We interpret each "generation" as a year. This parameter for the riskless technology gives a risk­
free rate of 5% per year. The premium for holding the risky techology is between 5% and 10 3 
per year. In figure 3, we graph the change in unconditional expected output due to introducing an 
insider in the economy for different levels of the persistence parameter, I· Our measure of welfare is 
expected output (expectations are taken before any trading on the current. market occurs). Since all 
agents are risk neutral, this seems a reasonable welfare measure. In fact, this measure corresponds 
to the Pareto criterion. An alternative measure would be to focus solely on uninformed investors 
and examine their expected consumption. In eit.her instance, t.he measure of the net value of the 
insider is given by the difference in the measure (e.g. expected out.put.) bet.ween the economy with 
and without the insider. 
At I = 0, the productivity shock is i.i.d., so the insider's privat.e information has no value
in future product.ion decisions. At. this point., the uninformed invest.ors pay the insider premium 
without getting any useful informat.ion. Thus, expected output is lower in the economy with the 
insider. At / equal t.o one, there is no private information in the economy. As I increases from 
zero, the expected productive value of the insider's private information increases, and reaches an 
interior maximum for a value of / strictly between zero and one. The expect.ed insider premium 
changes with /, reaching an interior maximum at a value between zero and one. Together, the 
relations imply that the change in expected out.put. due to introducing the insider takes on the 
humped shape shown in figure 3. 
Increasing the difference between the liquidity shocks h - l increases the trade size that the 
insider can successfully conceal. This increases her profits and hence the distortionary effects of 
the insider withou.t cl1anging the value of information released by th.e insider. I11creasing 11 - L 
has t.wo effects on the welfare measure. Firstly, it increases the insider premium, increasing the 
investment distortions. However, it also increases the expected value of the insider's information. 
The net welfare change depends on which effect dominates. 
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2 Long-Term Insider 
We now introduce a long-term insider to project B, one who will have insider information in 
the future as well as the present. Specifically, the long-term insider is assumed to have inside 
information about two consecutive projects. This allows us to capture the qualitative effects of a 
long-term insider in a simple fashion. 
We believe this model captures important elements of insider trading in small resource ex­
ploration stocks. Such insiders may forsake short term trading profits from information about a 
resource discovery for the greater future insider trading profits associated with increased explo­
ration. Other relevant examples include new product development, risky high technology R&D, 
takeovers and mergers. 
For expositional ease, we introduce particular functional forms for the two production technolo­
gies: 
(14) 
The benefit of making these assumptions is that it implies that the payoff of project B is linear 
in the beliefs µ of the uninformed that the current technology shock is high. 8 We analyze perfect
Bayesian equilibria of this model. 
Since the information in her trade size conveyed through the equilibrium price affects future 
investment levels and hence future insider profits, when young, a long-term insider will consider 
the effects of her trades on the information content of prices. In the last period in which she has 
inside information, her horizon is identical to that of a one-time insider, so that their behavior will 
be identical. Consequently, the equilibrium pricing function for the short-term insider will clear the 
market when the long-term insider is old. We use the subscript. and superscript o to index states
and functions associated with this "old insider" who is in the last period of her life. Similarly, we 
index states and functions associated with the first. period of the insider's life by y. To simplify 
notation, we drop the date t subscripts. replacing them with y or o where appropriate.
The "young insider" chooses her trade size to maximize discounted expected profits. She weighs 
the current profits from insider trading against the change in the present value of future insider 
profits due to the effect of the release of news on investment. We use p > 0 to denote the weight 
placed on second project insider trading profits. We allow the possibility that p > l. This captures 
8The results of this section can be generalized to different production technologies. 
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the idea that fund-raising/investment may take place only at the beginning of an insider's affiliation 
with a firm, but that the insider will have many subsequent opportunities to trade on future 
information without affecting investment. 
Following the analysis of the short-term insider we know that given beliefs µy that the current 
technology shock is H, that the uninformed investors' first order conditions for investment which
pays off when the insider is old are 
r = (E [11°111,p�] -E [I P(7r(llY)) 111,p�]l 2�, (15) 
where (}0 refers to the unknown technology shock two periods hence, which the insider will trade 
on when old, OY is the young insider's current private information, and II refers to last period's
publicly observed technology shock. Here, K'B refers to the aggregate capital invested in the risky
project. when the insider is young about which she will have private information when old, and 
K1 represents the existing aggregate investment. in the project that pays off next period about
which the young insider currently has private information. We use k to denote the investment of 
individual uninformed traders. IP( 7r ( n)) is the insider premium that the young insider will receive
when she is old, given that her private information when young is n E {L, H). 
Using the uninformeds' beliefs µy that the current technology shock is H, we can solve for the
current new aggregate investment in project B. Substituting from (15) yields: 
where 
1 [ (h -l)(H -L) l C = 2r 7r(L)H + [1 -7r(L)JL + 2 7r(L)[l -7r(L)] , 
{H-L) [ ({h-1)\ l D = 2r [7r(H) -rr(L)] 1 - 2 ) [l - 7r(H) -1r(L)] .
(16) 
(17) 
(18) 
The above reveals that C > 0. Our assumption that the productivity process exhibits positive 
persistence implies that 7r{H) ;::: 7r{L), so that D ;::: 0: the more promising investors believe the
current project, the more they invest. If the technology shock is i.i.d., then 7r{H) = 7r(L), D = O
and IP( 7r(H)) = IP{ 7r(L) ) . In the case of a symmetric transition matrix for the technology shock,
where 7r{H) = 1 -7r{L), so that the unconditional probability of a high shock is equal to !, again
IP{,,.(L)) = IP(,,.(H)). If1T(H) > 7r(L), then as the probability that 8° = H increases, so does the
expected value of 11°. Of course, the expected value of the insider premium also depends on the 
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probabilit.y that ()0 = H. However, the effect of increasing the expected return on capital in the
risky project outweighs any effect on the insider premium, and so investment in the risky technology 
increases. 
Given the uninformed investors' beliefs µy and the young insider's private information, ()Y, the 
expected second project insider profits are given by: 
pl P (7r(()Y)) (C + Dµy]· (19) 
This confirms that expected future profits are linearly increasing in the beliefs of the uninformed 
investors that ()Y = H.
In the first period of her life, the long-t.erm insider's problem is to choose a trade quantity 
qY(()Y, (), K]j; µy) to maximize lifetime expected profits, where she explicitly takes into account the
possible effects of her trades on the beliefs of uninformed investors. Her problem can be written as: 
max E ()Y . 
[ qY[()Y _ (µy(qY - 8Y,.)(H- L) + LJJ/'Kfi ]
qY 
+ pl P ( 7r( ()Y)) ( C + Dpy( qY - sY,.)) 
(20) 
Expectations are taken over values of the liquidity shock. The insider's conjecture about the 
specialist's belief function satisfies rational expect.at.ions. The above objective funct.ion for the long­
term insider reflects the condition that the specialist's beliefs correspond t.o those of the current 
uninformed invest.ors both on and off the equilibrium path. The first. term in the objective function 
refers to the long-term insider's first. period insider trading profits. The second term gives the 
present value of future insider trading profits. This is affected by the insider's first. period trade 
through the uninformeds' beliefs, as a function of the first. period price.
Inspection of the long-term insider's objective function reveals that. the insider gets no benefit 
from revealing her private information when young if either D or p = 0. If p = 0, the long-term
insider does not care about future profits, so she maximizes one period profits. When 7r(H) = ?T(L),
the technology shock is i.i.d. so that the current. technology realization does not help to predict 
future realizations and l1ence the uninformed investors 1 expectations of future productivity sl1ocks 
are unaffected by the insider's privat.e information. In this case, D = 0, and the insider's second
period profits do not. depend on the uninformed invest.ors' beliefs. Consequently, if either p = 0 or 
7r(H) = 7r(L) then the long-term insider maximizes one-period profits: 
16 
Lemma 3 Necessary conditions for the equilibrium with the long-term insider to differ from the 
equilibrium with the short-term insider are: 
p > 0, (21) 
rr(H) > rr(L) . (22) 
We now analyze equilibria in which the above necessary conditions are satisfied. We start by 
considering the trading game that occurs when the insider is young. Intuitively, two conditions 
must be satisfied for an insider seeing good news to prefer to trade in such a way as to reveal 
her information. First, it must be the case that she gains more from positively influencing the 
beliefs of uninformed investors and hence increasing investment than an insider seeing bad news 
gains. That is, it must be true that. next period's insider premium is greater for an insider who 
currently observes a good realization: IP(rr(H)) > IP(r (L)). Otherwise, the insider seeing bad 
news gains more from convincing the uninformed investors that the realization was in fact a good 
one - because both her current profits as well as her future profits would be greater. But, for the 
insider to see bad news and then convince the uninformed that the realization was a good one 
would be inconsistent. with equilibrium. That is, the bad insider's non-mimicry condition would be 
violated. 
The second condition which must be satisfied is that. the future insider profit generated by 
revealing good news must be sufficiently high relative to the cost of forgoing current insider profits. 
This is an implicit. condition on the size of the current capital stock which will determine profits 
from concealing information relative to p, the weight the insider places on future profits. 
Suppose now that the young insider inherits a capital stock k. 0 < k $ 1. We first. provide
· necessary bounds on k for the young insider to complet.cly reveal her private information in the
equilibrium of the resulting trading game. Then. we determine conditions on k for the equilibrium
to feature concealment. Finally, we determine which capital stocks the young insider will inherit in 
equilibrium. At this investment level, the equilibrium price distribution that. the uninformed expect 
to receive next period, when trading against a new young insider, satisfies rational expectatio11s. 
The following proposition provides the conditions on the capital stock when the insider is young 
for a fully revealing equilibrium to exist. 
Proposition 3 A fully revealing equilibrium exists in which the young insider reveals her private 
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information if and only if the capital stock that the young insider inherits, k, satisfies, 
where 
1 
'1i:: (H _ L)(h -l) D
 [IP (7r(H)) -IP (7r(L))]
If {23) is satisfied, then the following describes the equilibrium: Let 
ii E [pIP(7r(L))D -l pIP(7r(H))D _ h].
(H-L)/K '(H-L)/K 
(23) 
(24) 
(25) 
A. The insider seeing good news trades qH > ii+h, and the insider seeing bad news trades 9L < ii+l. 
B. The beliefs of the market makers and uninformed investors that OY = H are a function of the
trading volume v that they observe. and are given by 
µy(v) = { 0.1. 
C. The investment of the uninformed is gi·uen by: 
v <ii 
v;::: ii. (26) 
(27) 
This result. is intuitive: algebraic manipulation or equation (24)reveals that. the necessary and 
sufficient conditions for '1i to be positive so that the insider ever cont.emplates completely revealing 
her private information are 
and 
7r(H) > 7r(L) (since 7r(H);::: 7r(L)) 
7r(H) + 7r(L) < 1. 
But these are the necessary conditions for next period's insider premium to be greater for an insider
who currently observes a good realization: IP( 7r(H)) > I P(7r(L) ). That is, these are the necessary 
conditions for the insider who sees good news to gain more from convincing the uninformed investors 
that the realization was, in fact, a good one than the insider who sees bad news. Solving the second 
inequality in terms of the unconditional probability that 81 = H yields the following:
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Corollary 1 A necessary condition on 7r, the unconditional probability that 61 = H, for a fully 
revealing equilibrium to occur when the long-term insider is young is gfoen by 
(28) 
If this inequality holds and 7r(H) > 7r(L), then IP(7r(H)) > IP(7r(L)), so that. iJ! > 0. A good 
shock must be enough of a surprise for investment to change enough for it to be worthwhile for 
the insider to reveal her private information. From now on, we will assume that 7r $ �, so that
IP(7r(H))?: IP(7r(L)). 
Even if iJ! is positive, then k must still be small enough that the future benefits obtained by 
the insider who sees good news by revealing her private information outweigh the trading profits 
she could achieve by trading to conceal her information today: equation (24) provides the specific 
bound. If k is low enough that the insider who see good news wants to reveal the news, then
she must trade enough that the bad insider has no incentive to mimic her. The condition that 
qH ?: v + h describes the necessary minimum bound on the trade size. Similarly, the insider seeing
bad news must sell sufficient quantities to ensure that the good insider has no incentive to trade in 
such a way that her trade might be confused with that of t.he insider with bad information in order 
to earn short-term profits. If the insider short-sells, the uninformed believe that the productivity 
realization was a bad one so she cannot earn positive insider profits. 
The largest that k can be is one. If (24) can be satisfied for k = 1 .  then in equilibrium
the young insider always reveals her private information. The right hand side of ( 24) is strictly 
increasing in p when the necessary conditions for complete revelation to occur are satisfied. In 
these cases there is a p large enough for such a full revealing equilibrium to exist. Solving for this 
p yields the following corollary. 
Corollary 2 If iJ! > 0. and if p sati:sfies the following bound, then there exists an eq'llilibrium where 
the yo'llng insider always /ally reveals he1· private information at all eq'llil£brium information sets. 
(29) 
If the young insider cares enou.gl1 aboltt her future trading profits, then sl1e Tnill f11lly reveal her 
private information when young. As iJ! decreases, the required p increases. We now show that if the 
young insider inherits a large enough capital stock, then equilibrium in the trading game involves 
the insider concealing her private information. 
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Proposition 4 In the trading game when the long-term insider is young, an equilibrium involving 
the insider trading such that in states { (H, l ), (L, h)} trading vo/'Ume is uninformative and in states 
{ (H, h), (L, l)} trading volume is fully informative exists if and only if the capital stock that the 
young insider inherits, k is large enough: 
(30) 
where piI! is defined as in (24). If VK > piI!, is satisfied, the strategy of the insider is unique: only
the off-equilibrium beliefs of the uninformed investors and market makers differ across equilibria. 
The following describes an equilibrium with a piece-wise linear pricing schedule. 
A. The insider's trades are given by 
H: qH = 2r('lf-L) {7r(O)JP(7r(H))+ (1- 7r(O)]JP(7r(LJJ}+ (1- 7r(O))(h-l), (31)
L : q[, = 2r('lf L) { 7r(O)J P(7r(H)) + [1 - 7r(O)]J P( 7r(L))} - 7r(O)(h - 1) ,
where 7r(O) denotes the pri.or probabili.ty that the i.nsider's information wm be H. 
B. The beliefs of the market maker and uninformed are giuen by:
where 
µy(v) = 1,
v :::: q]1 - h - 7r ( h - l) 
v � q/1 - l 
{ 0. 
7r(O) + 6 (v - q]1 - h) else, 
2. _ (H - L)(l - 7r(O)) 
-
(H - L)qC - p/P(�(Jl))D . H 2rV7'< 
C. The investment of the uninformed agents is given by 
Ks= min { 1, (C + Dµy)2}.
(32) 
(33) 
Note from (31) that the long-term insider's trade is strictly greater than the short-term insider's 
trade in this equilibrium. As either the weight insiders place on future profits, p, increases, or 
amount that investment changes by cl1angh1g i11vest.or beliefs, D, i11creases1 tl1e equilibrium insider 
trades increase, so that the equilibrium volume at which the market maker cannot discern good 
news from bad increases. This is because an insider who sees bad news also has an incentive t.o 
increase purchases or short sell less in order to influence investor beliefs. If insiders value future 
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profits sufficiently, an insider seeing bad news will even purchase a positive amount in an attempt 
to conceal her news from investors. That is, she incurs a short-term loss in order to increase 
investment. Note also that as p -+ 0, or D -+ O,the long-term insider's trades converge to the 
short-term insider's. 
It is straightforward to show that when W > 0 (the necessary conditions for any revelation to 
occur are satisfied) no pure pooling equilibrium exists in which the young insider trades the same 
quantity irrespective of her private information. This follows because there is no volume so that 
both types receive payoffs of at least their full-information values. If W = 0, the equilibrium with 
the long-term insider is the same as the equilibrium with the short-term insider. Together with 
Propositions 1 ,  3 and 4, the above implies that for k =/. pif!, the pure strategy equilibrium uniquely 
identifies the young insider's payoffs and the investment by the uninformed born that period. In 
the pure strategy equilibrium, the insider always trades to reveal the current productivity shock 
if (1) the insider premium associated with good news exceeds that associated with bad news (and 
D is positive) and (2) ...Ji.,. is sufficiently large. Otherwise, the insider always tries to conceal her 
v' j.; 
information so that the equilibrium is partially concealing. 
When K = pW, then both fully revealing and partially concealing equilibria exist. In this case,
we assume that the market maker randomizes over the pricing functions that support the fully 
revealing and partial pooling equilibria, with probability w, 0 $ w $ 1 of choosing the partially 
concealing pricing function. Since the market maker earns zero expected profits in both equilibria, 
he is indifferent. bet.ween the equilibria, and so will mix. Thus, if K = p'I!. to the young insider, a
fully revealing equilibrium occurs with probability 1 - w. In general equilibrium, the investment by 
uninformed investors must be consistent with the subsequent actions of insiders. Since the payoffs 
to the uninformed are discontinuous in whether the insider successfully conceals her information, 
the general equilibrium may require this mixing to smooth the payoffs of the uninformed investors. 
The mixing probability chosen by the market maker is such that the resulting equilibrium price 
distribution satisfies the rational expectations of the uninformed who trade against the young 
insider, and hence is consistent. with their investment. In "p" space, holding the other parameters 
of the economy constant, for a given public information state, there is generally a range of p's 
for which general equilibrium would mandate this mixing. The probability that the market maker 
selects the revealing equilibrium price schedule, w(p) is increasing in p in such a way that ,/ -. e is
/\ (..,(p)) 
constant, where K(w(p)) is the equilibrium investment level by uninformed investors who correctly 
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anticipate this mixing probability (detailed below) .  
Let 11'(0°) be the probability that OY = H, before the young insider receives her private infor­
mation. Following the discussion above, we write the young insider's expected first period trading 
profits as a function of k, w, and 7r(0°) as 
where 
¢ (k,w, 11'(0°)) {k,{ 0, 
¢ (k , w, 11'(0°)) = w!P(7r(0° ) ) ,  
IP(7r(0°)), 
k < pif! 
k = pif! 
k > pif!. 
{34) 
(35) 
We are now ready to determine the investment. strategies of the uninformed who will trade 
against the young insider so that t.he result.ing equilibrium prices satisfy rational expectations. 
Since the uninformed act competitively, their first order conditions are given by: 
(36) 
where again K1 denotes the aggregate investment of the uninformed for t.he project that pays off 
when the new insider is young. Also. 11'(0°) denotes the probability that. BY = H conditional on
the current old insiders private productivity shock. In equilibrium, we have k� = K�, and so the
equilibrium { K1 (B,p[J) , w(B,p[J ) }  solves:
(37) 
In  the next lemma, we give the unique solution to the above equation. 
Lemma 4 The ·uniq·ue sol-ution to equation {37), and th'lls the investment of the uninjo'f'med born 
when the insider is old, is given by: 
> pif! (38) 
otherwi.se 
When JK1(fJ,p[J) = p'i!, the mixing probability chosen by the market mal.•er, w(O,p[J),  is consistent
with the investment by the 'ltninformed, so that 
0 E (OY/O,p';,) - 2rpif! w(O,pn)  = 
E (JP(7r(0°) ) /0, p[JJ . 
22 
(39) 
Thus, we have: 
Proposition 5 An equilibrium to the long-term insider game exists. Further, the expected profits 
of all market participants are unique across all possible equilibria. 
Since E (llYIH] ;:: E [!IY/L] , then if E (llY IH] :::; 2fp'11, the young insider will always reveal reveal
her private information at all information sets in equilibrium. If IP(11:(H)) > IP(11:(L)), so that
W > 0, then there will always be a weight on future profits, p* large enough such that the young 
insider will reveal her information in all states. The critical p* is given by: 
• E (!IY /H] P = 2rw 
If W > 0 and the insider values her future profits enough, the young insider will always trade to 
reveal her private information in equilibrium. 
Before proceeding with a numerical example, we present an important welfare implication of 
the model. If the long-term insider ever chooses with positive probability to reveal her information, 
then the uninformed prefer to trade against a long-term insider than against a short-term insider. 
Si11ce investment. improves in tl1is case, even tl1e insiders are better off1 leading to a strict Pareto 
improvment over the short-term insider case. 
Proposition 6 The ·uninformed always weakly prefer to trade agninst a long-term insider. If 
max (E (llY ln] - E (IP(11:(11°)1n)]J < 2fp'11 ,nE{L.11) ( 40) 
then the uninformed strictly prefer trading in an economy with a long-term insider to trading in 
an economy with a short-term i.nsider. When the abo·11e inequality is satisfied, then any equilibrium 
with a long-term insider ex ante strictly Pareto dominates all equilibria with a short-term insider. 
Long-term insiders do not always create adverse selection problems and more information is 
released through prices. The above inequality insures that. there is a positive probability that the 
young insider will trade to completely reveal her information. An uninformed investor is aided 
by more informative prices in the past. (no adverse selection) because they help target current 
investment, and are helped by Jess adverse selection in the future because they do not have to pay 
an insider premium in those instances. 
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2.1 Example 
We continue with our previous example. Figure 4 plots the change in unconditional expected output 
due to introducing an insider into an economy with the following parameters: 7r = 0.3, h - l = 0.5,
H = 2, L = 0.1 ,  r = 1.05. The bottom curve shows changes in expected output in the case where
p, the weight that the insider places on future profits, is equal to zero. In this case, the equilibrium 
with the long-term insider is the same as that with the short-term insider. The top curve shows 
changes in expected output for p = 6. In this case, the insider will reveal her private information
with probability one when last period's productivity shock was L for all values of / above 0.35. 
In this case, the long-term insider strictly Pareto dominates the short-term insider. The set of 
persistence parameters where the economy with the longer-term insider is Pareto dominated by
the no-insider economy shrinks as p increa5es. With a large enough persistence parameter, the 
young insider will always reveal her information. In these cases, expected output. wit.11 the long­
term insider exceeds expected output with the short-term insider. This surplus is split between the 
long-term insider and the uninformed investors. 
The middle curve shows the change in expected out.put. for p = 5. In this case, the young insider 
reveals her private information for all values of the persistence parameter above 0.55. 
3 Conclusions 
This paper introduces inside traders into a dynamic general equilibrium economy in which unin­
formed, but rational. traders choose investment levels across assets with different. levels of adverse 
selection. The investments of these liquidity traders depend crucially on the information held by 
the insider which is revealed through the equilibrium price. We distinguish insiders by the length 
of time over which they will have access to inside information. This enables us to examine the con­
sequences for their incentives either to conceal their information so as to obtain immediate profits 
or to trade in such a way that they reveal their information and thereby influence investment. 
When inside information has little predictive power for future payoffs, introducing an inside trader 
to the economy causes welfare losses because ail types of insiders seek to profit by concealing their 
information. Further, any slight benefits of informative prices fail to counterbalance the direct costs 
of trading in a market with an insider. Insider trading distorts investment so that. the marginal 
costs of capital are unequal across otherwise identical investment opportunities. 
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However, when an insider's information has 11igh value in investment decisions, the insider1s 
presence is socially beneficial. This is particularly true when the insider has a long-term relationship 
with a firm and, hence a stake in future investment. To the extent that she influences future 
investment decisions through her inside trading, the insider may want to trade in such a way as 
to reveal her information. Consequently, prices are more informative and uninformed investors are 
less likely to receive "unfair" prices if they have to liquidate their holdings prematurely. For the 
long-term insider to convince investors that she has observed good news, or to conceal her bad 
news, it may be necessary for her to hold a portfolio featuring a large stake in her firm. 
These features, we believe, may closely characterize small exploration or R&D firms. There is 
often more "private information/insider trading" in such firms. Significant investments by insiders 
are frequently, if sometimes fraudulently, trumpeted. The theory also predicts that such firms 
should have greater and more variable gross ret.urns than others, generating a "liquidity premium" 
in their stock returns. 
25 
-h 
Figure 2 - Equil ibrium Beliefs 
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Appendix - Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1 
Proof: Since the market maker earns zero expected profits for any given net order flow then
Lb (xk-1,1+1) :S Ps (vh,x1-1,1+1 , e1) :S Hb (xk-1,1+1) .
This follows because were the price outside these bounds, the market maker would buy /sell the asset 
at a price greater or less than payoffs in any possible state, violating the competitive zero expected 
profits condition. Note also that in any equilibrium without adverse selection, the insider's expected 
profits must be zero state by state, since the price must equal the expected value of the asset 
conditional on the insider's private information should there be no adverse selection in equilibrium. 
So suppose that for any net order flow prices are between Lb (Kl-l,t+l) and Hb (Kt-l,t+lj. We 
show that this implies that the insider can earn positive expected profits in at. least one state so 
that the equilibrium must feature adverse selection. In state H, for any order submitted by the 
insider, q, her expected profits are: 
q [Hb ( Kk-l,l+l) - (�) (Ps ( q -h, xl-l,l+l, e1) + Ps ( q - 1, xi-l,l+l, e1) )] • (Al) 
For this to be non-positive, it must be that for vh > -h, 
(�) ( P8 ( vh. x1-1.t+1, e1) + Pn ( vh + h -I, K'-1,1+1, 01)) ;:: Hb ( Kk-1.1+1) . (A2) 
Similarly, it must follow that for v£ < -I, 
(�) (Ps (vk.K1-1,1+1.e') + Pa (vk + l-h, K1-1,1+1 , e') ) :<:; Lb (xk-1,1+1) . (A3) 
Let -h < vh < -1. To satisfy (A2), we must have Pn (vh, ·, ·) 
(A3) . Pn (vh.- , -) = Lb (xk-l,t+l). II 
Proof of Lemma 2 
Proof: Suppose the insider sets
Hb (K1-1.1+1) B . f = B . ut to sat.is y
q(H, Kk-1,t+l) -h = q(L, Kk-1,1+1) -I, 
so that the market maker cannot determine the production shock in the states {H, h} and {L, 1} .
Substituting the market maker's zero expected profit condition in for eq-uib:b·r1>um prices and using 
Bayes' rule, we see that the insider's eq·uilibri"Um expected profits in states H and L are given by:
H : q ( H, Kk-l.t+l) ! (H -L) (1 - 7r(01)) b ( Kk-l,l+l) 
L : - [q (H, Kk-l,i+l) + (h - IJ] ! (H-L) 7r(81)b (Kk-l,i+l)
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(A4) 
respectively. These are both non-negative if and only if, 
0 $ q (H, K1-1·'+1) $ (h-1). 
Inspection reveals that the only other ways to induce adverse selection are either to set 
or to set 
(H Kt-1,t+I) = ( L  K1-1 ,1+1) q ' B q ' B '
(H  Kt-1 ,t+I) -I - q(L K
t-1,t+I) -h q ' B ' B ·
But, these trades cannot make non-negative expected profits in both states H and L. So, set the 
insider's trades to a(h-l) in state H and (a-l)(h - 1) in state L. Substituting these expressions
into the insider's expected payoffs yields: 
�( h-l)(H - L)7r(ll1) (i -7r(ll'J) b (x1-1•1+1) = IP (7r(ll' l) b (x1-1 ·'+1) ' (A5) 
which does not depend on a. Iii 
Proof of Proposition 1 
Proof: Verification that (A), (BJ, (CJ describe an equilibrium 
Statement (C) follows directly from lemma 2, since the liquidity traders know that the expected 
loss to the insider trader is given by: 
( h  -l)�H -L) {µ7r(H)[l - 7r(H)] + (1 -µ)7r(L)[l -7r(L)] }  b ( K'·1+2) .
If the insider's private information is H (L), any volume less (great.er) than zero results in nega­
tive expected profits for the insider, as long as the market maker's pricing function lies bet.ween
Lb (x1-1·'+1) and Hb (K1-l ,t+l) . Therefore, we only need to verify that the insider does not
wish to trade any other positive (negative) volume if she observes H (L). Using the above pricing 
function, the insider's expected profits from following the equilibrium strategies are given by: 
H :
T · � .
(!) {1 - 7r(IJ1))2  (h-l)(H-L)b (x1-1•1+1) ,
(!) (7r(ll'))2 ( h - l)(H -L)b ( K1-1.1+1) .
The insider's expected profits for an order of size ( h  -l) > q > 0 in state H are given by: 
q [ H -( �) ( H + µ ( q -h, . , -) ( H -L) + L)] b ( x1-1 .1+ 1)
( 1 ) [ l b (  1- i t+i\  = q °2; l-µ (q-h, -, -)_ ( H-L) ,K8 ' ) 
(AG) 
$ q (�) (1 - max {o, 1 - (l-7r(ll'�)
2 (h-I) }] (H-Llb (x1-1•1+1) , (since q-h = v�)
$ (�) (1 - 7r(ll1))
2 
( h-l)(H-LJb (K1-l ,t+I) ,  
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using the left-hand side of the inequality in (11). But 
represents the insider's expected profits in state H from submitting the proposed equilibrium volume 
of 
(1 -7r(ll'l) (h-1).
If the insider submits an order q 2:: (h -l), beliefs will be given by 1 irrespective of the level of the
liquidity shock. In this case, her profits will be zero. Therefore, the proposed equilibrium volume is 
optimal given the above pricing function. Similar logic shows that volume -7r(ll1)(h - l) is optimal
in state L given the beliefs in (B). Hence, given the beliefs in (B) the strategies presented in (A) 
are indeed optimal. 
In this proposed equilibrium, the market maker only observes volumes of: 
( 1 -7r(ll')) (h -l) - h, or ( 1 -7r(111) (h -l) - l in state H;
(l-7r(ll'J) (li-l) - I, or (-7r(ll1)) {h - 1)-I in state L.
Thus, for observed equilibrium volumes beliefs are considered with Bayes' rule. For off-equilibrium 
volumes beliefs satisfying (11) lie between 0 and l .  Therefore, given the insider's strategies in {A) ,
the beliefs in {B) are consistent with equilibrium. So, (A) ,  (13) ,  (CJ describe an equilibrium of the
game. 
Uniqueness 
By lemma 2, we know that in any equilibrium the insider must trade a(h - l) in state H and
{a -l)(h -1) in st.ate L,  where 0 :S a  :S l. So, suppose
{a{h - 1), {a -l)(h-1)}  
describes equilibrium strategies of the game. Let m{ v)  be the beliefs of the market maker that
support this equilibrium. The proof that. a is unique is divided int.a two claims. 
Claim 1 :  If m{v) supports an equilibrium a, so does t.he revised set of beliefs:
m'(v) = 1 v 2:'.-I 
{r m{v) -h < v <-I 
0 v :S -h 
Proof: In state H, for (h -l) > q > 0, for a to be an equilibrium, m(v) must satisfy:
o:(h - l)(H -L) (1 -7r{l.l1 ) )
2 
> ( rr-L1
(
, [(m(q-h) + m(q-l)] \q n  ' \. - 2 }
2:: q(H -L) (1 - (m(q-;•) + l)) 
= q{H - L) (l - [m'(q 
- h)
; 
m'(q-1)]
) 
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(A7) 
since q > 0.
If the insider trades d ;::: (h - l), then the beliefs will be H under m* (·) ,  leaving the insider zero 
expected profits for this trade. Therefore, beliefs m* ( · )  will still make a(h - l) an optimal choice 
in H if beliefs m( ·) do. Similar reasoning holds for state L. 0
Claim 2: In a.Iiy equilibrium, a =  1 - 7r(B'). 
Proof: By claim 1 ,  we can take beliefs such that
m(v) = 1 , v > -l, m(v) = 0, v < -h. 
For a trade ( h - /) > q > 0:
m(q - h) = l. 
For a(h - l) to be the optimal trade in state H, 
a(h - l)(H - L) (1 - 7r(81 ) )
2 
a(h - l) (1 - 7r(B'l) > q(l - m(q - h)) .
Since v = d - h, (A8) implies for -h < v < l ,  
1 - 7r(81) 
m(v) $ 1 - a(h - l) 1 .v +  ' 
For a trade ( l - h) < q < O. 
m(q - l)  = 0. 
For (a - 1 ) (  h - l)  to be an optimal trade in state L, 
( 1  - a)(h - l)(H - L)rr(81) > -q(H - L)m(q - l )  
2 - 2 
Since v = d - l, (AlO) implies that for -h < v < -l, 
rr(81)  
m(v) < (a - l) (h - l ) --'---'-- (v + I) 
Combining (A9) and (All)  yields for -h < v < -1, 
(1 - 7r(81 ) )  (h - l)rr(81) 
1 - a( h - l) 
v + h $
m(v) $ (a - 1) v + l  
.
For the above to lead to beliefs between zero and one, it must be that for -h < v < -!, 
Solving for a, 
) 
(h - l)7r(81) (h - l) (1 - 7r(li1)) 
(a - 1
(v + l) 
;::: 1 - a
(v + h) . 
(v + h) 
a(v + l + 7r(81)(h - l) )  :'::: (h - l) (v + l + 7r1(h - l)) .
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(AS) 
(A9) 
(AlO) 
(All) 
(A12) 
(A13) 
Let 
so that 
v = -l - ?r(O') (h - l)  + <(h - l),  , > 0,
v + h = (1 - 7r(O') + <) (h - l).
This is certainly feasible for -h < v < -I and £ small. Then we have:
a ::; 1 - 7r(01) + £.
Let 
v = -l - ?r(01) (h - I) - <(h - l) , > 0.
Again, this is feasible. This gives 
a :'.:: 1 - 1r(01) - £.
Combining (A14) and (A15), for £ >  0 
1 - 7r(01) - c $ a $  1 - 7r(01) + '· 
Thus, in order for (A12) to be satisfied, a =  1 - ?r(O') .  This proves claim 2. D 
Therefore, 
{ (i - 7r(01)) (h - l),  -?r(01)(h - l)}
(Al4) 
(A15) 
are the only strategies by the informed that can be supported in equilibrium. This a implies that 
the belief function of the market maker and the investment strategies of the uninformed are as 
presented in (BJ and (C). II 
Proof of Proposition 2
Proof: Together, (12) and ( 13) imply that: 
a' ( 1 - k;/+2)
b' (k�1+2)
(A16) 
The strict concavity of b( - )  and concavity of a( · ) implies that "'i,;7,�fl is strictly increasing in Ks.
II 
Proof of Lemma 3
Proof: If p = 0, then the long-term insider's objective functions are the same in every possible
node of the game as the short-term insider's objective function. Thus, the game is the same 
as the game with the short-term insider and consequently, the equilibria must be the same. If 
?r(H) = ?r(L) then using (18) ,  D = 0, and IP(7r(H)) = IP(?r(L) ) . So, the objective function of
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the young long-term insider differ from that of the short-term insider by a constant that does not 
depend on beliefs of the uninformed agents nor the private information of the long-term insider. 
Thus, the game with the long-term insider is isomorphic to the game with the short-term insider 
state by state. II 
Proof of Proposition 3 
Proof: If the insider reveals her private information in equilibrium, then her equilibrium payoffs 
are given by: 
H :  plP(7r(H)) [C + D] 
L : plP(7r(L))C 
Let. µ( v) be the equilibrium belief function. For notational ease, define:
- 1 µ(q) = 2 [µ(q - h) + µ( q  -l)] '
the beliefs that the insider expects to receive given that she trades a quantity q. Suppose that the 
insider trades a quantity q in state H. Then, her payoffs would be given by:
q ( 1  -ji.(q)) (H - L) VK + pl P( 1r(H) )[C + Dji.(q)J.
Optimality of the revealing equilibrium payoffs when the private information is H requires: 
pl P(1r(H) l[C + DJ 2: q ( 1  -ji.(q)) (H -L)
VK 
+ pl P(1r(H))[C + Dji.(q)J,
or, 
o 2: (1 - fl.(q)) [q(H - LJVK - plP(7r(H))D] .
To satisfy (Al8). beliefs must satisfy 
or, translating to beliefs, µ( v),
jl.(q) = l ,  plP(7r(H) )D q > 
(H - L)
/K '
( ) 
plP(7r(H))D h µ v = 1, v > r;; - . 
(H-L) v K  
(Al7J 
(Al8) 
(Al9) 
Suppose that the insider trades deviates from the equilibrium by trading a quantity q when her 
private information is L. Then, her expected profits are given by
-qji.(q) (H -L)
VK 
+ plP(7r(L)) [C + Dji.(q)]. (A20) 
Appendix-6 
34 
Optimality of the revealing payoffs in state L requires 
or, 
To satisfy (A21), 
or, 
plP(7r(L))C ;::: -qji,(q)(H - LJVK + pIP(7r(L))[C + Djt(q)] ,
o ;::: ji,(q) [-q(H - LJVK + pIP(7r(L))D] .
jt(q) = 0, plP(7r(L))D q < /;; ' (H - L) v K 
( ) 
plP(7r(L))D l µ v = 0 v < 
(H _ L)/K 
- . 
A belief function, µ(v) exists which satisfies (A19) and (A22) if and only if. 
0 < VK $ (H _ ��h - l) [I P(7r(H)) - I P(7r(L) )].
{A21) 
(A22) 
Verification that (A), (B) and (CJ describe an equilibrium follows from the above arguments since 
the pricing function satisfies (A19) and (A22). II 
Proof of Corollary 1 
Proof: Using (2), the condition that 7r(H) + 7r(L) < 1 can be written as: 
27r(l - 'Y) + 'Y < 1 .
Since 0 $ 'Y < 1,  the result follows. II 
Proof of Corollary 2 
Proof: This follows from solving the equation pW ::'.: 1 for p. II 
Proof of Proposition 4
Proof: Necessity: In the equilibrium, the insider with good news trades qy and the insider with
a technology shock of L must trade qr so that 
' ' qr - • = qy - n. 
The insider's expected profits are given by: 
H : qy 1 1 -;10))(H - L)/K + pIP(7r(H))[C + D11+;10n] , 
L :  - (qy - (h - 1) ] •�) (H - L)/K + pl P(7r(L))[C + D l •�0) ) ] ,  
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(A23) 
where 7r( II) denotes the probability that the insider's private information is H, conditional on
last period's publicly observed technology shock. Since the insider seeing good news can trade an 
unbounded amount, her profits would become unbounded if beliefs of the market maker did converge 
to one as the volume gets arbitrarily large. Similar reasoning applies to an insider seeing bad news, 
eventually beliefs must converge to 0 for a small enough volume. But then, in equilibrium, there 
are strategies for insiders with both types of information such that their separating profits can be 
obtained. Since the trades qn and qL must be optimal, the insider's profits evaluated at these
trades must be at least as large as their separating payoffs. This implies the following inequality 
for the insider with a productivity shock of H, 
or, 
pIP (,,-(H))D 
qn 2 r;; . (H - L) v K  
Similarly, for the insider with shock L, 
7r(ll) r;-_ (7r(ll)J - [qn - (h -1)] -2-(H - L)V K + plP(,,- (L)) [C + D-2 -J 2 pl P(,,-(L) )C.
or, 
qn $ plP(,,-(LJ )f! + (h - 1) .
(H - L)..fK 
A qn exists which solves (A24) and (A25) if and only if 
thus proving necessity. 
(A24) 
(A25) 
Sufficiency: To prove sufficiency, we show that the strategies and beliefs given in the proposition 
give an equilibrium when the inequality in (30) is satisfied. Statement (B) defines beliefs which are 
consistent on the equilibrium path. and between zero and one off the equilibrium path. Statement 
C follows from the uninformeds' first order conditions. It is straightforward to verify that maximiz­
ing the insider's expected payoffs subject to the belief function yields the trades given in statement. 
A.  when (30) is satisfied. This proves sufficiency. 
Uniqueness: The proof that the insider's trades are unique follows the same logic as in the unique­
ness proof for the short-term insider. The only way that we can find a set. of consistent off­
equilibrium beliefs is when the insider seeing shock H trades a quantity such that 
qs = 2r(:f- L) {1r(ll)IP(,,-(H)) + [1 - ,,-(ll)]IP(,,-(L)) } + (l  - ,,-(ll))(h-1).
II 
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Proof of Lemma 4 
Proof: The result follows by inspection. II 
Proof of Proposition 5 
Proof: Together, propositions 3 and 4 imply that for any capital stock that could be inherited 
by the young insider, an equilibrium to the trading game exists. Further, the ex-ante payoffs to 
the insider, before seeing her private information are unique as long as the capital stock inherited 
does not equal pii!. Lemma 4 implies that there is only 1 investment that the uninformed who will 
trade against the young insider will make at every information set. Further, the mixing probability 
for the market maker is unique and so if the young insider inherits a capital stock equal to pii!, her 
expected profits are unique. 
In the last period of the insider's life the game is isomorphic to the game with a short term 
insider. So, the expected insider premium for the uninformed who trade against the old insider is 
unique, and thus the uninformeds' investment decision is unique. 
Thus, there is one and only one investment decision that can be make at any information set in 
the game such that rational expectations are satisfied about the distribution of future prices. This 
set of investment decisions clearly gives us an equilibrium. Since there is only one equilibrium in­
vestment decision at every node, and expected payoffs of the insider, market maker and uninformed 
agents are unique in the investment levels, the equilibrium payoffs of the agents are unique. II 
Proof of Proposition 6 
Proof: An uninformed investor who will trade against the old insider always has a weakly finer 
information partition with a long-term insider than a short-term insider; he is weakly more likely to 
know (JY. Ceteris paribus, the expected profits of an uninformed investor are greater if he knows BY, 
since he can trivially make the same investment independent of BY. Uninformed investors who trade 
against the young insider are also better off because they are less likely to face adverse selection in 
the next period with a long-term insider and their information sets are the same whether or not 
the insider is a long-term or short-term insider. Therefore, the uninformed weakly prefer to trade 
against the long term insider. 
If inequality ( 40) is satisfied, then there is a positive probability that the young insider will 
trade to completely reveal her information in equilibrium. By the arguments given above, the 
uninformed investors strictly prefer this to trading against the short-term insider. In this case, the 
investment of the uninformed is closer to the efficient level than with a short-term insider; there 
will be less under-investment in the risky technology. Therefore, expect.ed outpnt will be higher, 
leading to a strict ex ante Pareto improvement since all agents are risk neutral. II 
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